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INTERVIEW 
 
Jérôme Ballet (E&E) - Displacement of people for development projects poses the problem 
of defining the contours of what is meant by this expression. Can you clarify these 
contours? 
  
Jay Drydyk (J.D.) - When the problem first came to attention, in the 1980s and 1990s, it was 
viewed alongside parallel cases of population displacement by natural disasters armed 
conflict. Also, the academics who first took up the cause were studying refugees and 
forced migration. So at the time it seemed natural to classify displacement by 
development as another kind of forced migration. But then, when policy started to be 
developed, a problem arose: what to say about people banned from forests that were 
being converted into nature reserves? Typically what happens in these cases is that 
people are banned from a core area, and there are also restrictions on their use of 
surrounding areas, but their villages do not move. Still, people are denied access to 
forest areas that may have contributed to their livelihoods. Excluded from these zones, 
people can find it more difficult to make a living. So in these respects, displacement 
from ecological or animal reserves can have impoverishing effects on the displaced 
people, even though they are not forced to migrate. In view of this, the World Bank 
and other institutions have recognized displacement from eco-reserves as a form of 
displacement by development. This is clearly inconsistent with the idea that 
displacement is a form of forced migration. So far, people have simply put up with the 
inconsistency, but as a philosopher I could not, so with my co-authors I have gone 
against current by proposing that ‘displacement by development’ means being 
excluded, as a result of development activity, from territory on which people relied for 
livelihood purposes.  
 
E&E - The numbers of people displaced by development projects are prodigious. How do 
you explain that so little attention has been assigned to this problem? Does the 
compensation principle have not too hastily led to the belief that the problem was 
solved? 
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J.D. - Actually, policy-makers have paid attention within institutions such as the World 
Bank, OECD, and regional development banks. I think there were two causes. 
One was that some very principled people within those organizations spoke up 
about the issue, and the best known is Michael Cernea, formerly of the World 
Bank. He and others successfully showed that displacement by development has 
the effect of impoverishing the ‘oustees’. This touches on the other cause of 
change, which is that these impoverishing effects contradict the mandate of 
development institutions to reduce poverty. In the MacNamara era, poverty 
reduction was elevated within the mission statement, so that Cernea and others 
could hardly be ignored when they showed how Bank-funded projects impoverish 
people, through displacement. So, to be blunt, the institutions were shamed into 
adopting social safeguard policies, along with a tribunal of sorts – the Inspection 
Panel – to provide recourse when people are harmed through disregard of those 
policies. Critics say that the Inspection Panel has not been very effective, and I 
agree, but its creation does at least indicate awareness of the problem.  
 Public awareness of the problem is a different matter. Who has not heard of the 
Three Gorges dam project in China, or the Narmada dams in India? But is the 
global public aware of the human costs that have been paid by people who have 
been flooded out of their villages? Probably not. 
 
E&E- The compensation principle does not imply an equitable sharing of benefits but 
only compensation for damages caused to displaced populations. Is it not a source 
of blatant injustice? 
 
J.D.- Yes, it is unjust in more ways than one. In the 19th century, if people were 
compensated at all, it was through payment for land lost. So, for example, 
legislation was in place in colonial India providing for land expropriation, and this 
was used after 1911 for creating the broad avenues and imposing government 
buildings of New Delhi. Other development projects in India (and elsewhere) 
traded land for land, but in many cases there was no such land available, and (as in 
the Three Gorges project in China) replacement land is not sufficiently productive 
to replace people’s livelihoods. By the time that new policies evolved in the 
1980s, a new concept had replaced these older ideas of compensation, and that 
was restoration of livelihoods. 
If livelihoods are not restored, the injustice is quite obvious. People whose 
livelihoods are reduced by displacement are forced to make a greater sacrifice 
than their fellow citizens for the development of their country. And this sacrifice 
is imposed on them arbitrarily, just because they happened to be ‘in the way’ of 
development. You might compare it to an arbitrary tax.  
But the same argument supports benefit-sharing. Even if people are resettled and 
their livelihoods are restored to previous levels, they will have put in much of the 
effort to bring this about. And they will have borne many risks: how would they 
make a living in their new location, how would they maintain the social networks 
and social capital they had relied upon in their old location, how would they renew 
their cultural life, and so on? If these efforts and risks are not compensated, then 
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once again the ‘oustees’ are forced to make a greater contribution to development, 
just because they are ‘in the way’. Justice requires treating like cases alike, but 
without compensation plus livelihood restoration plus benefit sharing, displaced 
people are being treated much worse than their fellow citizens. 
 
E&E- Do you think another challenge is the so-called "consent principle" that one gets 
from people? 
 
J.D.- Most development banks requires developers to seek people’s consent to be 
displaced, but they do not require that this consent be obtained, except in the case 
of indigenous or aboriginal peoples – who are protected under international law. 
Should everyone’s consent be obtained? This would eliminate forced evictions for 
development purposes. Some interpretations of international law have moved in 
this direction, though most interpretations allow forced evictions when required 
for development that is in the public interest.  
 I find that to require the oustees’ consent would be in one way too strong, but in 
another way too weak. It is too strong because it would give landowners unilateral 
veto-power over development for others. Suppose a bridge is proposed over a 
treacherous river section, where people are killed every year trying to make the 
crossing. Should a single landowner hold veto power over such a project? That 
would seem to subordinate some people’s lives and safety to the property rights of 
others. Also, would the more powerful landowners not use such veto power to 
gain advantages over people who were poorer, less powerful, and therefore more 
interested in sharing in the benefits of such a project? On the other hand, once 
consent is given, it no longer protects people as the project and the resettlement 
proceed. There may be little they can do in case what was promised them is not 
delivered. That is how consent is too weak. 
 
E&E- What does this mean for institutions to take seriously into account the well-being 
of people? 
 
J.D. -Instead of consent, displaced people need empowerment, and they need this in 
order to protect their own well-being. This means having a voice in planning and 
decision-making about resettlement. More controversially, it means being able to 
arrest a development project if promises that were made are not kept. This was 
proposed in 2000 by the World Commission on Dams, and it is still quite 
necessary because other compliance mechanisms available to the oustees – both 
legal and administrative mechanisms – are too often unreliable. This is the key 
point at which policy development has stalled. With regard to empowerment, both 
states and development banks have drawn a line that they refuse to cross. 
 
E&E- Could we consider that defining responsibilities for development agencies is a bit 
of a trap, to the extent the development is first and foremost a market where 
players are at least partially in competition? 
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J.D. - For even the best procedures that we can imagine now, there are probably many 
such traps. For example, imagine a resettlement process in which the villagers 
participate fully in decision-making. Now, within the village there is already a 
power structure, with some families being wealthier and more influential than 
others. They can be expected to use their greater power to their own greater 
advantage, exploiting any advantages that might come to them through the 
resettlement. What obligations do the developer, the state, and the development 
bank have to prevent or limit this kind of exploitation?  
I think the most honest answer is simply to say that we need more research before 
we will be able to answer challenges like these. On the other hand, that is no 
reason for doing nothing to change policy and procedures now. To return to my 
example, even if the community did not participate fully in decision-making about 
their resettlement, the more powerful families could be expected to use their 
greater influence to give themselves better protection against the risks of 
resettlement. For the poorer and less powerful families, gaining any voice is still 
an advantage, compared with having no voice, since it gives them at least some 
small opening for protecting themselves, even if they may not always be 
successful. So, in general, it seems right to advocate for greater democracy and 
empowerment, even if we cannot be certain of their effects in all instances. 
 
 
